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Impairments in inhibition or cognitive control in psychological disorders
Paula T. Hertel ∗
Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 1 Trinity Place, San Antonio, TX 78212, USA

Abstract
Contributions to this special issue of Applied & Preventive Psychology richly elucidate connections between a variety of psychological disorders
and performance in a number of tasks that are used to reason about inhibitory deficits. This commentary calls attention to the different uses of the
concept of inhibition – vernacular, neural, operational, and theoretical – and suggests that the term cognitive control avoids claims about dampened
memory representations that are difficult to support. Central findings from the reviews are summarized; evidence concerning suppression-induced
forgetting is featured and directions to foster application are discussed.
© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cognitive control; Inhibition; Psychological disorders

Inhibition is a seductive construct in psychological research,
particularly in accounting for phenomena associated with
emotionally disordered and thought-disordered states. Cycles
of rumination, implicated in problems with mood regulation,
could be banished with a healthy inhibition construct. Intrusive
thoughts and flashbacks, characteristic of dissociative states,
could be reigned in. Clang associations and frenetic behavior
might be organized anew. As scientists interested in psychological disorders, we must pay careful attention to the phenomena
associated with the inhibition construct because they constitute
a salient set of cognitive difficulties experienced in disordered states. As scientists interested in building parsimonious
theoretical frameworks, however, we should ask whether the
construct of inhibition is warranted, or whether instead we can
make due with more general accounts of the same cognitive
difficulties. The authors of the contributions to this special issue
have summarized empirical research, the importance of which
does not depend on our choice of theoretical constructs. Before
offering brief comments on these important findings, I call
attention to the diversity of ways in which the term inhibition
has been used; inhibition is not just a theoretical construct
anymore. Next, I summarize non-inhibitory approaches to
explaining the phenomena.
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1. Introductory notes on terminology
1.1. Inhibition: A term with many uses
In the first article of this issue, Dillon and Pizzagalli begin by
reminding us that the “inhibition of irrelevant or inappropriate
actions, thought, and emotions is critical to adaptive functioning.” By using the vernacular meaning of inhibition, indeed the
importance of stopping cannot be overemphasized. And as all
the contributions have illustrated, psychologically disordered
people have various difficulties in bringing actions, thoughts
and emotions to a halt. On the level of brain mechanisms, the
concept of inhibition refers to neurochemical events, critical to
perception and action; however, although chemical disturbances
sometimes characterize psychological disorders, inhibition at
the cellular level is typically viewed as irrelevant to cognitive
psychological accounts that stress inhibition (see MacLeod,
Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003).
An operational definition of the concept inhibition as it
applies to performance in cognitive tasks refers to belowbaseline performance. That is, if some action, thought or emotion
is inhibited it is less likely (or takes longer) to occur relative to
a control condition. Paradigms that operationalize inhibition in
this way include negative priming and suppression-induced forgetting. The distinctions between these operational uses of the
term and the theoretical uses that sometimes accompany them
are often blurred. Theoretically, the term inhibition is situated
within the larger context of a representational model of mind. As
a consequence of cognitive processing, this framework assumes
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that mental representations of percepts or concepts are activated
or inhibited, for a period ranging from milliseconds to years (see
Kolers & Roediger, 1984) and with consequences for subsequent
processing.
All four ways in which the term inhibition can be used –
vernacular, neural, operational and theoretical – can be found
in the Dillon and Pizzagalli’s introduction to this issue. The
three reviews of disorder-related findings are also sensitive to
these definitional issues. Yet it is sometimes difficult for the
less sophisticated reader to realize that the use of the term in
one sense is separable from the other meanings of the term.
For example, all three reviews discuss evidence gathered from
negative-priming paradigms. The name of the paradigm itself
tends to blur the lines between operational and theoretical definitions. Negative priming can be thought about in operational
terms as the increase in the time to respond on trial n if the
stimulus was ignored on trial n − 1. But of course priming primarily refers to a change in the level of activation associated
with a memory representation; thus, the label biases the type of
explanation. In short, the multiple uses of the term inhibition
sometimes make it difficult to separate the observed phenomena from the neuroscientific and theoretical accounts that are
proposed to explain them.

nitive control; in this broad sense, there is often no need to posit
the inhibition of a particular representation (also see Moors and
De Houwer for a discussion of distinctions among the concepts
controlled, intentional and conscious; for example, a controlled
procedure can be invoked automatically). An emphasis on cognitive control adequately addresses performance on interference
tasks that are sensitive to individual differences (e.g., Kane &
Engle, 2003). And deficits in cognitive control clearly characterize performance by psychologically disordered individuals, not
only in stopping thoughts and actions, but also in their initiation (see Hertel, 2000). Moreover, neuroscientific investigations
identify frontal structures and functions that correspond to cognitive control. According to Dillon and Pizzagalli’s introduction,
measures taken during antisaccade, go/no-go and stop-signal
tasks, all paradigms of response stopping that are sensitive to
neural deficits, reveal likely pathways from control centers in the
prefrontal cortex to more stimulus- or response-specific areas of
the brain. Joormann, Yoon, and Zetsche discuss these pathways
with reference to depression and note studies in which the maturation of frontal structures is correlated with improved cognitive
control. Thus, the language of control provides the more general approach and one that subsumes processes involved in a
variety of procedures (e.g., search, disengagement, switching,
suppression, strategy use).

1.2. Alternative accounts of the phenomena
2. Deﬁcient control in psychopathological states
The reviews in this issue describe non-inhibitory accounts
of the observed phenomena—accounts that do not refer to
the theoretical dampening of memory representations (e.g.,
episodic retrieval and feature-mismatch accounts of negative
priming). To briefly illustrate these accounts we might say
the following: a current display recruits a prior-processing
episode along one or more dimensions of similarity, including
time. Details of the prior-processing episode – such as attentional disengagement from the irrelevant stimulus – tend to
be replicated in the current trial and thereby introduce conflict and associated cost when the task demands competing
thoughts or actions. Neill and Mathis (1998) coined the term
transfer-inappropriate processing to represent this mismatch
of the required processes across episodes. (It is important to
note that the term episodic retrieval does not imply uses of
memory as a separate “entity” from other processes; instead
the term is intended to stress the dependence of performance
on the prior-processing episode.) Similar accounts, many of
which are summarized by MacLeod et al. (2003), have been
offered for performance costs in a variety of paradigms, without invoking the notion that a memory representation has been
inhibited.
Is inhibition a theoretical construct that carries its own
weight? The way to decide, of course, is to test hypotheses generated specifically for that purpose (see Levy & Anderson, 2002).
The way not to decide is to use the various meanings of inhibition interchangeably. As alternatives to the theoretical construct
of inhibition, terms associated with cognitive control are more
theoretically neutral and apply to actions as well as to thoughts.
A recent essay on automaticity by Moors and De Houwer (2006)
argued that the stopping of action or thought is a marker of cog-

The articles in the special issue share a first-order emphasis
on experimental approaches to understanding deficient cognitive control in disordered states. This emphasis contrasts with
the tendency for some clinical investigators to use self-report
inventories to describe cognitive problems. Self-reports might
be informative to the extent that individuals notice features of
their own mental experience, even though they are influenced by
demand, response bias and context of administration. But even
when we are able to notice broad-brush tendencies to think in
particular ways, the inventories themselves can offer no clues
about fundamental mechanisms, because we cannot observe
our own basic processes. On the other hand, while expressing
similar concerns about self-reports, Joormann et al. illustrate
how they can be used effectively. For example, the finding
that self-reports of rumination are correlated with experimental evidence of deficient control provides converging evidence
concerning the possible role of rumination in depression (also
see Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Slightly different difficulties
exist when trying to reason from deficits on neuropsychological tests, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task because
they were not designed to reveal the operation of specific procedures, as Dillon and Pizzagalli note. Yet evidence of impairments
on these tests sometimes provides direction for experimental
investigations. Of course, all contributions to the special issue
refer to performance on self-reporting inventories as a method
for representing individual differences in psychopathological
tendencies; diagnostic criteria rely on self-reports, as well. However, hypotheses about the corresponding deficits in inhibition
and control are tested mainly with experimental methodologies,
not merely by asking participants to report their difficulties
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in controlling or inhibiting their actions, thoughts, or emotions.
2.1. Dillon and Pizzagalli: Evidence from neuroscience
The introduction by Dillon and Pizzagalli is focused on differentiating neural pathways corresponding to the control of
action, thought, or emotion in general terms, irrespective of
psychopathology. Much of this and similar research does not
demand the use of inhibition as an explanatory construct. For
example, we have known for some time that depression is associated with changes in activity in prefrontal cortical regions
associated with cognitive-control functions (see the review by
Levine, Heller, Mohanty, Herrington, & Miller, 2007). Another
example concerns evidence for reduced hippocampal volume
as a risk factor for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. According
to Dillon and Pizzagalli, this evidence suggests an impaired
ability to control the expression of fear. They remind us that
spontaneous recovery of previously extinguished fear responses
in non-human species reveals that fear is inhibited (at least
in the operational sense) instead of being “unlearned” during
extinction trials. Classic theories of conditioning referred to
inhibition in the theoretical sense to account for spontaneous
recovery. In contrast, Dillon and Pizzagalli report evidence that
fear is regulated through control mechanisms that differentially
involve the amygdala and hippocampus. Moreover, some of this
research on fear extinction targets inhibition at the neural level.
Finding possible connections between neural inhibition and cognitive control is an important step in theory development, with
implications for pharmacological approaches to psychopathology.
2.2. Joormann, Yoon and Zetsche: Depression
In the review of research on deficient cognitive control in
depression, Joormann et al. emphasize the link between ruminative tendencies and performance in experimental tasks. They
summarize ways in which the inhibition construct has been integrated into accounts of a wide variety of cognitive procedures
during the past 20 years or so. Notably, the review spans evidence
of deficits and biases, both typical of depression-related findings.
In line with their emphasis on the role of rumination in depression, Joormann et al. use the inhibition construct to represent
difficulty in disengaging from prior mental events; control functions associated with disengagement are situated at the center
of depression-related differences. Clearly, the constructs disengagement and inhibition play similar roles, regardless of whether
one thinks about turning away from an irrelevant stimulus on
a preceding trial in a negative-priming task or from a subset
of items from the previous display in the modified Sternberg
task. The difference is that disengagement refers to an attentional process whereas inhibition refers to the state of a memory
representation.
Perhaps the most important feature of Joormann et al.’s review
is the consistent emphasis on personally relevant emotional
events as central features of problems with cognitive inhibition
or control. Emotion motivates ruminative thoughts at the outset,
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and emotion is exacerbated by the difficulty in ignoring those
thoughts as a result. Also important is the corresponding brief
review of neuroscientific research concerning the connections
among emotional meaning, attentional processes, and emotion
regulation in depressed states.
2.3. Dorahy: Dissociative identity disorder (DID)
Emotion is also featured in Dorahy’s contribution to the special issue. It begins by describing experiments conducted within
the framework of the flanker paradigm for investigating negative priming and reviews potentially related research from other
paradigms. The focal result is the failure of DID participants to
show the typical negative-priming effect (i.e., longer times to
classify the target if it had served as distractor in the previous
display) on trials preceded by a brief display of a negative word
(e.g., hell), even though they produced intact negative priming on trials preceded by a neutral word (e.g., book). Unique
to DID, this pattern was not found in samples of individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder or depression. Dorahy
argues that weakened inhibition is adaptive in threat-related situations for people who have experienced repeated traumatic
events. There are two alternative explanations from the point
of view of transfer-inappropriate processing (Neill & Mathis,
1998).
First, as Dorahy clearly explains, anxiety associated with the
context word might actually prevent attention to distractors on
the prime trial, such that attention need not be disengaged in
order to respond to the prime target; effectively the probe target
on a “negative priming” trial is processed much like the probe
on control trials, resulting in no negative priming. Second, anxiety might distribute attention across distractors during prime
trials. If distractors are attended on trial n, their presentation as
targets on trial n + 1 should not produce evidence of slowing.
This second alternative—seen by Dorahy and others as failed
inhibition—is consistent with much of what Dorahy tells us
about the phenomenon of DID (e.g., focus on irrelevant features
of the environment during abuse), as well as with the literature
on divided attention and working memory. The flexibility of this
mechanism across contexts is, furthermore, consistent with an
emphasis on disturbances in cognitive control.
2.4. Minas and Park: Schizophrenia
Like Dorahy, Minas and Park review findings from negativepriming paradigms. Because it is difficult to measure negative
priming with verbal materials in thought-disordered individuals,
spatial tasks have been used. Performance in these tasks reveals
clear inverse relationships between negative priming and the
degree of acute disturbance or the degree of susceptibility to
thought disorder (although less clear relation to the presence
of medication). Minas and Park use the spotlight metaphor of
attention (see Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 1999) to frame their
review. The diameter of the spotlight (and also the opening of
the window) is conceived to be wider in individuals diagnosed
with schizophrenia than in other individuals. These metaphors
suggest issues for future research regarding the distribution of
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attention across the larger “space.” For example, should we think
in terms of less controlled focus of attention in prime displays
and subsequently reduced conflict on the probe trial?
Minas and Park believe that future research should identify
which aspects of psychotic syndromes are more closely aligned
with inhibitory deficits. The clinical sense of the need for control
or inhibition points to positive symptoms. Research that permits
the examination of correlation with symptoms might indeed suggest future directions. However, evidence regarding deficient
cognitive control and prefrontal dysfunction in schizophrenia is
already available in a variety of tasks (e.g., Braver, Barch, &
Cohen, 1999).
2.5. Evidence for inhibition in remembering
Joormann et al. and Dorahy describe findings relevant to
disorder-related impairments in memory tasks. One line of
this research—the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm—deserves
extended comment because this line is aimed directly at the
problem of distinguishing between theoretical inhibition and
the more general concept of cognitive control. The research
concerns the effects of thought-suppression on later attempts
to remember. As Joormann et al. point out, the reasoning is similar to the negative-priming paradigm; turning attention away
from a concept that might come to mind is like turning attention
away from a percept in a prime display; both acts should make
it more difficult to comply with the subsequent instruction to
attend.
Briefly, the TNT paradigm begins with a phase of learning cue-target pairs, typically words. Next, individuals practice
recalling the targets when given some cues and suppressing all
thoughts of the targets when given other cues, although still
other cues are reserved for baseline comparison on the final test,
in which all cues are presented for target recall. Suppressioninduced forgetting is found when, compared to baseline, targets
are less well recalled on the final test as a function of amount of
previous suppression-practice.
Some results from TNT experiments suggest that individuals
who are depressed or dysphoric forget less well than nondepressed controls (see Joormann et al.). Impaired forgetting in
this paradigm suggests impaired control of attention—away
from targets—during the suppression phase of the experiment.
However, other TNT experiments (although not with depressed
samples) argue more directly for the usefulness of an inhibition construct. The critical test, invented by Anderson and
Green (2001), follows the usual final test of cued recall with a
second test involving study-independent cues, yet still requiring recall of studied targets. For example, if ordeal-roach is
studied and ordeal is used as the cue for suppression-practice
and on the first final test, insect–r serves as the independent cue on the second final test. Anderson and Green found
evidence for suppression-induced forgetting even when targets
were cued in this study-independent way. Importantly, inhibition seems to be the only way to explain why the suppressed
thought is poorly recruited by episodically irrelevant information. Therefore, tests with independent cues should be used by
researchers interested in building theories of psychological dis-

orders around the construct of inhibition (see Wessel, Wetzels,
Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2005, for TNT research on dissociation).
Very recently, a different type of support for the theoretical construct of inhibition was found in a neuroimaging study
with faces as cues and emotional pictures as targets in the
TNT paradigm. Depue, Curran, and Banich (2007) conducted
hypothesis-driven scans during recall-practice, suppressionpractice and control trials. Prefrontal regions corresponding
to cognitive control showed greater activation on suppression
trials, compared to baseline. Also, sensory areas of the posterior cortex (during the suppression of emotional pictures) and
attentional gating areas of the thalamus normally active during
memory retrieval showed decreased activity on suppression trials. The hippocampus and amygdala showed similar reductions.
This pattern of activation of control structures and reduction in
task specific areas goes a long way to providing support for the
notion of cognitive inhibition (see Anderson et al., 2004, for
related findings). Importantly, during the last block of suppression attempts, hippocampal activity was reduced to the extent
that the image was later forgotten on the final test. This was a
later-occurring process; early attempts to suppress implicated
control of sensory activity. These changes in patterns as a function of practice suggest that mechanisms of cognitive control can
result in neural versions of inhibited memory representations.
The later changes also correspond to our sense of inhibition as an
automatic process that no longer requires the control of attention
to other matters. Evidence from a related neuroimaging study,
performed during a retrieval-induced forgetting procedure, also
suggests that there are neural benefits to having suppressed competing memories (Kuhl, Dudukovic, Kahn, & Wagner, 2007).
Demands on the prefrontal cortex were lessoned to the degree
that unpracticed but potentially competing targets were forgotten
on the final test.
The changes with practice observed in these neuroimaging
studies are clinically interesting because they suggest that continued attempts to suppress are qualitatively important. (They
also might address the question of why findings in TNT and
related experiments on the consequences of suppression seem
to differ from self-reported failures in other thought-suppression
paradigms in which cues are not repeatedly presented.) Finally,
Depue et al. also noted the involvement of the right-hemisphere
pathway from control structures to hippocampus and amygdala during tasks that involve emotion regulation; the similarity
between these patterns is consistent with behavioral evidence
for connections among rumination, impaired control, and emotion regulation in depression (see Joormann et al.). A next step
for researchers interested in disorder-related impairments is to
determine whether these activation/reduction patterns change
across samples in ways that converge with our knowledge of
behavioral deficits.
3. Conclusions
Contributions to this special issue of Applied & Preventive
Psychology richly elucidate connections between psychological
disorders and performance in tasks that are used to reason about
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inhibitory deficits. In most of the reviews, connections between
cognitive deficits and emotional features of the task or context
play prominent roles in differentiating performance.
I conclude first with a cautionary note: we should be conservative in claiming deficits in either cognitive control or inhibition
under conditions in which inattention is suspected. Dorahy
raised this issue concerning evidence of reduced negative priming in DID by asking whether avoidant processing styles extend
to “failed” processing styles. Minas and Park’s review suggests
that a similar wariness might apply to reduced negative priming
in schizophrenia. Engagement is a prerequisite for disengagement. In experiments on negative priming, evidence of positive
priming would help to resolve this issue. Similar issues possibly occur in relation to performance by disordered individuals
in other paradigms. For example, depression-related deficits in
remembering that result from impaired control during learning
can masquerade as superior suppression-induced forgetting. In
short, these reviews remind us that the determination of processing deficits is often not as straightforward as it might initially
seem. If this is true in experiments, how much more true might
it be in applied settings?
My second set of concluding comments concerns application. Consider the finding from Dorahy that negative priming did
not occur in threat-related contexts in the DID group. At first,
extrapolating these results to the real-world might seem difficult until we realize that these carefully controlled tasks merely
make it possible to identify effects that occur ubiquitously.
The connections between rumination and emotion discussed by
Joormann et al. make real-world examples more obvious. The
question to ask next is: how might clinical researchers facilitate the application of our knowledge about control deficits
to therapeutic uses? And the answer is likely to be found in
attempts to train attentional control. Research on training the
control of attention—whether through mindfulness techniques
or some more specific procedure—should inform both theory
and practice. Again, let us consider an example from Dorahy’s
essay and his suggestion that divided attention provides a model
for control difficulties in DID. Training attentional control and
showing subsequent negative priming is a potentially useful
strategy. Similarly, considering the possibility that depressed
people might have difficulty suppressing unwanted thoughts,
efforts to train the use of thought substitutes during suppression in the TNT paradigm provides another direction (Joormann,
Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, submitted for publication). As illustrated decades ago by classic research on the extinction of fear
responses in non-human animals, a useful perspective for understanding a phenomenon is one that offers an approach to its
elimination (e.g., spontaneous recovery). This perspective can
guide the development of beneficial procedures for overcoming
control deficits, as well. Importantly, this perspective is useful
for the development of both theory and practice.
Finally, although clinical practice might not initially care
whether the effects described are better conceptualized as
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inhibition or cognitive control, theoretical progress depends
on getting our terms straight. Do we always mean inhibition in the theoretical sense when we use it operationally, in
the vernacular, or to describe neural processes? The contributions to the special issue all show that difficulties in stopping
actions, thoughts and emotion are exacerbated in psychologically disordered states. Whether we should explain all these
difficulties in terms of poorly dampened memory representations or merely dysfunctional mechanisms of control is not yet
clear.
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